

September 7, 1942.

**From:** Director Naval Officer Procurement, Los Angeles.  
**To:** Lieutenant (jg) Nathan Davis JUAN, D-7(F), USNR,  
 1001 - 1st Street,  
 San Francisco, California.

**Subject:** Modification of active duty orders.

**References:** (a) BuPers ltr BuPers-SEC-SEC JUL1425 dated August 23,  
 1942.  
 (b) BuPers dispatch 641225 of September, 1942.

**Enclosures:** (A) Reference (a).  
 (B) Certified copies of reference (b).

Paragraph 2 of basic orders is hereby modified to  
 conform with reference (b) in that if physically qualified  
 you will proceed to Washington, D.C., and report to the Chief  
 of Naval Operations for active duty in the Office of Strategic  
 Services.

I. C. JOHNSON

C. D. CANNON  
 By Direction

Chief, Naval Procurement (Distribution),  
 1001 - 1st Street,  
 San Francisco, Cal.  
 1001 - 1st Street,  
 San Francisco, Cal.  
 1001 - 1st Street,  
 San Francisco, Cal.  
 1001 - 1st Street,  
 San Francisco, Cal.

*Copies to  
 Smith  
 Brown  
 Cunningham  
 Appleton*





file

100-100-1  
100-100-1  
(100-100-1)

August 21, 1942.

Subject:

Notice that with you and elsewhere - complete  
against representation, they, the United States and  
transportation of such information.

\*\*\*\*\*  
Immediately, you will report yourself directly, in person, to Washington, D. C.,  
and report to the Chief of Naval Operations for active duty in the Office of  
Naval Operations.

Copy to:  
1. Mr. [Name] (Information),  
2. Mr. [Name], D. C.  
3. Mr. [Name], D. C.  
4. Mr. [Name], D. C.  
5. Mr. [Name], D. C.  
6. Mr. [Name], D. C.  
7. Mr. [Name], D. C.  
8. Mr. [Name], D. C.  
9. Mr. [Name], D. C.  
10. Mr. [Name], D. C.

[Name] [Name]

Copies sent  
Capt. [Name], [Name]  
[Name], [Name]  
[Name], [Name]

From: The Chief of Naval Personnel.

August 20, 1942.

To:

Ensign (S) William H. JAMES, D-V(P), USN,  
MC 1000, 1000.

Via:

Director of Naval Officer Procurement.

Los Angeles, California.

Subject:

Active duty with pay and allowances - chargeable  
against appropriation, "Pay, Subsistence and  
Transportation of Naval Personnel."

References:

- (a) Executive Order of September 8, 1939.
- (b) Naval Appropriation Act for current fiscal year
- (c) ALNAV 114, dated November 22, 1940.


Enclosure:

- (A) Affidavit re pension or disability allowance.
- (B) Pers R. Pers. 17.

1. Upon receipt of appointment as  
Ensign, and in accordance with the references, you will report to the place  
and report to the medical officer as may be designated by the Director of Naval  
Officer Procurement in your District for physical examination. You are hereby  
ordered to active duty for this purpose and will be considered in an active duty  
status during the time required for physical examination and for travel necessary  
for compliance with these orders.

2. If found not physically qualified, you will immediately return  
to the above address and upon arrival consider yourself released from active  
duty. In this event, the examining medical officer will advise the Bureau  
of Naval Personnel by dispatch, stating the defects in detail, together with his  
recommendation.

3. If found physically qualified, you will immediately return to the  
above address and upon arrival consider yourself released from active duty and  
will be considered in an active duty status during the time required for physical  
examination and for travel necessary for compliance with these orders. You  
will be considered in an active duty status during the time required for physical  
examination and for travel necessary for compliance with these orders. You  
will be considered in an active duty status during the time required for physical  
examination and for travel necessary for compliance with these orders.





Major Preston E. Jones (173444), M. L. S.,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
24th and E Streets, N. W.,  
Washington, D. C.

December 30, 1942.

Major Preston E. Jones (173444), M. L. S.,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
24th and E Streets, N. W.,  
Washington, D. C.

1. The Secretary of the Office of Strategic Services in the  
Military Service has been ordered on or about January 2,  
1943, from Washington, D. C., to New York, New York, to  
attend the Board of Inquiry, on temporary duty for the purpose of  
conducting the investigation of the Secretary of War, and  
upon completion of this temporary duty return to Washington,  
D. C.

2. The travel involved is chargeable to FD RA P 43-02.  
A 0229-03.

3. The Finance Office is hereby ordered to determine  
that the travel involved will include a copy of the voucher,  
showing the amount paid, which is such paid, voucher number  
and amount of this order. The copy of the voucher will be  
forwarded by letter of transmittal to the Assistant Secretary  
of the Office of Strategic Services, showing that the enclosed  
copy of voucher is forwarded for the purpose of securing re-  
imbursement from the Office of Strategic Services.

J. F. McGuire  
Assistant General.

OFFERING BRANCH, MAJOR MOORE: PH 74429

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
1942  
MAJOR MOORE: PH 74429  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
1942  
MAJOR MOORE: PH 74429

AS 202 - Jones, Preston E.  
(13-25-42)70-4.

Detached Service.

November 13, 1942.

Major Preston E. Jones, USMC, Infantry,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
1904 and E. Street, N. W.,  
Washington, D. C.

1. You are authorized detached service for a period  
of two (2) days, effective on or after November 14, 1942,  
for the purpose of proceeding from Washington, D. C., to  
New York, New York, and returning in connection with activi-  
ties of the Office of Strategic Services.

2. No additional expense to the Government will be  
incurred by reason of this authority.

By order of the Secretary of War:

W. P. Dyer

Adjutant General.

William B. Smith, Maj. McGuire, PH: 1059

Notations:

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, D. C.  
UNIT PROCEEDING FROM, ON, TEL. 1607, WASHINGTON BLDG.,  
NO. 1001, 1904, WASHINGTON BLDG.



(12-6-42)FO-A.

October 8, 1942.

Detached Service.

Major Preston L. Jones GS72462, Infantry,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
25th and E Streets, N. W.,  
Washington, D. C.

1. You are authorized detached service for a period of eight (8) days, effective on or about October 16, 1942, for the purpose of proceeding from Washington, D. C., to Worcester, Massachusetts, in connection with the activities of the Office of Strategic Services.

2. No additional expense to the Government will be incurred by reason of this authority.

By order of the Secretary of War:

RECEIVED

Adjutant General.

Officers Branch, Maj. McGuire tel 3059.

DISTRIBUTION:

OFFICE, OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, 25TH AND E STS, N. W, WASHINGTON, D.C.

CG, FIRST SERVICE COMMAND.

MR. TACKE, ROOM 1305, BUILDING





WAR DEPARTMENT

201-James, Preston  
Everett (8-1-42) EF

WASHINGTON

*File*

AUG 17 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan, Director,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
25th & E Streets, N. W.,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I have your letter of August 1, 1942, in which you recommend the promotion of Captain Preston Everett James, Military Intelligence, to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel, Army of the United States.

Under existing War Department policies, this case was submitted to the War Department Personnel Board for consideration. The Board returned this recommendation with the statement, "recommendation for the promotion of Captain Preston Everett James is approved for promotion to the grade of Major, AUS, only."

The promotion of Captain James to the grade of major was announced in paragraph 21, War Department Special Orders 217, August 13, 1942.

Sincerely yours,

*Henry L. Shimer*

Secretary of War.

WASHINGTON

AUG 13 1942

Honorable William J. Donovan,  
Director of the Office of Strategic Services,  
25th and E Streets, N. W.,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Donovan:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 1 in which you request the promotion of Captain Preston E. James, (O-172462) M.I. Reserve, to the grade of lieutenant colonel.

In consideration of your desire to promote certain officers now assigned to duty with your office, a copy of War Department Circular No. 161, 1942 is inclosed. The provisions of this circular govern present promotions in the Army. Your particular attention is invited to paragraphs 2, 6 and 9b, Section I thereof.

The records of this Department show Captain James was promoted to present grade on May 15, 1934. He allowed his appointment to terminate five years later without having complied with any of the requisites for promotion to the next higher grade. On May 15, 1939 Captain James was reappointed. His record does not show, prior to his being ordered to active duty, that he had performed any type of military duty subsequent to his reappointment.

In view of present promotion policies and the foregoing information, it is not believed that this promotion will be viewed with favor by the Personnel Board, to whom I have delegated authority in such matters. However, your request is being forwarded to the Board for such consideration as the case merits.

Sincerely yours,

*Henry L. Stimson*

Secretary of War.

Encl.

AUG 13 1942

Honorable William J. Donovan,  
Director of the Office of Strategic Services,  
25th and E Streets, N. W.,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Donovan:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 1 in which you request the promotion of Captain Preston E. James, (O-172462) M.I. Reserve, to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel.

In consideration of your desire to promote certain officers now assigned to duty with your office, a copy of War Department Circular No. 161, 1942 is inclosed. The provisions of this circular govern present promotions in the Army. Your particular attention is invited to paragraphs 2, 6 and 9b, Section I thereof.

The records of this Department show Captain James was promoted to present grade on May 15, 1934. He allowed his appointment to terminate five years later without having complied with any of the requisites for promotion to the next higher grade. On May 15, 1939 Captain James was reappointed. His record does not show, prior to his being ordered to active duty, that he had performed any type of military duty subsequent to his reappointment.

In view of present promotion policies and the foregoing information, it is not believed that this promotion will be viewed with favor by the Personnel Board, to whom I have delegated authority in such matters. However, your request is being forwarded to the Board for such consideration as the case merits.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War.

Enc.

[Cir. 161]

Circular  
No. 161WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WASHINGTON, May 26, 1942Promotion of officers in the Army of the United States. Section 1  
Special promotion system, Appendix B, MR 1-3. II

*1. Promotion of officers in the Army of the United States.*—Section 1, Circular No. 151, War Department, 1942, as amended by section I, Circular No. 115 and section IV, Circular No. 114, War Department, 1942, is rescinded in the following substituted therefor:

*1. a.* The peacetime systems of promotion prescribed for officers of the National Guard, the Officers' Reserve Corps, and retired Regular Army officers remain discontinued. All previous instructions on the subject of promotion of officers revoked by Circular No. 1, War Department, 1942, remain revoked. Other provisions of Circular No. 1, War Department, 1942, are rescinded.

*b.* The temporary promotion system applicable to all officers of the Army of the United States prescribed in Appendix B, "Special Promotion System" MR 1-3, October 30, 1939 (see II of this circular), as modified hereinafter, is continued.

*c.* Except as mentioned in *d* below, recommendations for promotion will be forwarded direct to The Adjutant General by the following for elements under their jurisdiction who are not granted authority herein to forward recommendations direct to the War Department:

- (1) Commanding General, Army Ground Forces.
- (2) Commanding General, Army Air Forces.
- (3) Commanding General, Services of Supply.
- (4) Army commanders (see *d* below).
- (5) Department commanders.
- (6) Defense command commanders.
- (7) Corps area commanders.
- (8) Independent Army corps commanders (see *d* below).
- (9) Theater commanders.
- (10) Chiefs of supply services.
- (11) Independent task force commanders (see *d* below).
- (12) Provost Marshal General.
- (13) Chief of the Armored Force (see *d* below).
- (14) Other commanders of field force units who are responsible directly to the War Department and who are not authorized to promote officers on their own initiative.

(15) Heads of divisions of the War Department General Staff and other War Department agencies and activities not otherwise provided for.

*d.* All recommendations for promotions of officers to grades of colonel and lieutenant colonel from units and activities under control of the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, will be forwarded through headquarters, Army Ground Forces. Recommendations for promotions of officers to lower grades from these units may be forwarded direct to The Adjutant General by the authorities listed in *c* above.

*e.* Recommendations for promotion will be limited to existing position vacancies (see par. 6, app. B, MR 1-3, (sec. II of this circular)). Recommendations for promotion to grades for which no authorized position vacancies exist will not be forwarded. Position vacancies are those positions

454765-43

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3



AL 201 - James, Preston S.  
(7-11-42)08

JPM/jp-2,105.

Orders.

July 31, 1942.

Captain Preston S. James O172462, M. I.,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D. C.

1. The Secretary of War directs as necessary in his military service that you proceed on or about August 1, 1942, from Washington, D. C., to Mount Hill, Virginia, on temporary duty for the purpose of carrying out the instructions of the Secretary of War, and upon completion of this temporary duty return to your proper station.

2. The travel involved is chargeable to MD 34 P 434-02 & 0413-03.

3. The Finance Officer making payment in connection with the travel performed will submit a copy of the voucher, showing the amount paid, with a copy of the voucher number and citation of this order. The copy of the voucher will be forwarded by letter of transmittal to the Adjutant General's Office, Attention: Finance Section, stating that the inclosed copy of voucher is furnished for the purpose of securing reimbursement from the Office of Strategic Services.

J. F. McGuire

Adjutant General.

Officers Branch, JPM-2,1 1039

RECEIVED

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, 2015 AND 2 STRONG, N. W.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

## THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington, D. C.

Office of Strategic Services  
21st and E Streets, NW.The Honorable  
The Secretary of War  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

This letter is to bring to your attention the case of Capt. Preston H. James, a reserve officer who was called to active duty on August 1 and assigned to this office. Capt. James has been on my staff since August 18, 1941, as Chief of the Latin American Section in the Branch of Research and Analysis. In civilian life Capt. James is professor of geography at the University of Michigan, and is a recognized authority in the field of Latin America. He has been a full professor at that university since 1934, and during the year 1940-41 his salary was over \$6,000. Capt. James is 43 years old, and was employed in this office at the grade of P-8 until August 1.

After serving for a brief time in 1918 in the officers' training school at Camp Lee, Capt. James became a reserve second lieutenant in the Military Intelligence Division early in the 1920's, and continued active in the reserve up to the grade of captain. He became inactive, however, about 1935. During the period since 1935 Capt. James has been in close touch with the officers of the Latin American Section of G-2, especially Col. H. Townsend Heard, now Chief of the American Intelligence Command, M.I.A. Capt. James furnished G-2 with the advance manuscript of his recently published book on Latin America as it was prepared. Col. Heard will, I believe, recommend him to you highly.

I wrote you about this officer on July 3, stating that his previous orders to active duty in Ohio

The Secretary of War - 2 -

August 1, 1942

be revoked. It was also requested at that time that Captain James be called to active duty with the rank of lieutenant colonel and assigned to this office. Thereafter Captain James' previous orders to active duty in Ohio were revoked, and he was ordered to active duty and assigned to this office as Chief of the Latin American Section. I understand that the War Department could not comply with the request that he be given the rank of lieutenant colonel because it was necessary when called to active duty that he take his reserve rank of captain.

In view of the foregoing circumstances it is respectfully recommended that Captain James be promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel. I believe that his professional standing, his long service as a reserve officer, and his continued interest in the work of the Intelligence Division after he became inactive, qualify him for this grade. In his dealings with other agencies in Washington in the Latin American field it would be of great assistance to him to hold the rank of lieutenant colonel which would be more nearly commensurate with his previous professional position.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan  
Director

P E James

DP—By direction of the President.  
 TR—Travel directed is necessary in military service.  
 KP—Will proceed to.  
 TPA—Travel by officer or his dependents by privately owned automobile is authorized. ES for officer's travel is Authorized, par. 1 g, AR 605-180.  
 AD—Active Duty.

Special Orders)  
 En. 198 )

WAR DEPARTMENT  
 Washington, July 25, 1942

## EXTRACT

Paragraph 20. DP following officer ordered to AD KP fr home to sta on date indicated.  
 MEM. PD 31 PACI-01-02-03-07-08-A 0425-23. All dates are 1942 and person not of AUS unless otherwise indicated:

Grade, Name, Section and Home Address	Eff. Date of Duty	Branch and Station to which Assigned	Date of Rank
Capt Preston Everett James 0172142, MT-Reg, Ann Arbor, Mich (Now at Washington, D C)	1 Aug.	O of Strategic Serv Washington, D C	1 Aug.

By order of the Secretary of War:  
Official:

J. A. VELLA,  
 Major General,  
 Adjutant General.

July 1, 1942

G. C. MARSHALL,  
 Chief of Staff,



HEADQUARTERS SIXTH CORPS AREA  
Office of the Commanding General  
U. S. Post Office Building  
Chicago, Illinois.

*James Preston 9203*  
*X-10000000*

In reply refer to:  
AG (CCA) (Enc) 201 - James, Preston Everett

June 25, 1942.

Subject: Physical Examination.

To: Captain Preston Everett James, MI-Res.,  
Dept. of Geography,  
University of Michigan,  
Ann Arbor, Michigan.

1. It is desired that you report at the earliest practicable date for a final type physical examination. It is recommended that this examination be given for General and/or Limited Military Service.

2. Present a copy of this letter and request the Medical Examiner to forward WD AGO Form #63 to this headquarters without delay. For your information, the nearest station for a final type physical examination is

The Station Hospital, Fort Wayne, Detroit, Michigan.

Travel in connection with this examination is to be performed without expense to the Government.

3. CONTACT PRESIDENT OF THE MEDICAL EXAMINING BOARD AT THE ABOVE STATION FOR APPOINTMENT PRIOR TO PROCEEDING TO STATION FOR EXAMINATION.

4. Request acknowledgment of receipt with information as to date you will report for physical examination.

By command of Major General GRUNERT:

RECORDED

Cy to Enc. E.M.A.

(CCA)  
Form #63.

*Max N. Gizon*  
MAX N. GIZON,  
Major, A.G.D.,  
Asst. Adj. Gen.

*Max N. Gizon*  
RECORDED  
RECORDED  
RECORDED

③

## THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington, D. C.

Office of Strategic Services  
15th and I Streets, NW.

July 3, 1942.

The Honorable  
The Secretary of War  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

This letter is to bring to your attention the case of Dr. Preston S. James, a Reserve officer recently called to active duty. Dr. James has been on my staff since August 15, 1941, as Chief of the Latin American Section in the Branch of Research and Analysis. In civilian life Dr. James is professor of geography at the University of Michigan, and is a recognized authority in the field of Latin America. He has been a full professor at that university since 1934, and during the year 1940-41 his salary was over \$6,000. Dr. James is 43 years old; he is employed in this office at the grade of P-3.

After serving for a brief time in 1926 in the Officers Training School at Camp Lee, Dr. James became a reserve second lieutenant in the Military Intelligence Division early in the 1930's, and continued active in the Reserve up to the grade of captain. He became inactive, however, about 1936. During the period since 1936 Dr. James has been in close touch with the officers of the Latin American Section of G-2, especially Col. E. Raymond Heard, now Chief of the American Intelligence Command, E.I.C. Dr. James furnished G-2 with the advance manuscript of his recently published book on Latin America as it was prepared. Col. Heard will, I believe, recommend him to you highly.

Dr. James has received orders to report for active duty on July 7 at Ft. Hayes in Columbus, Ohio. I would like to recommend that these orders be recalled, and that instead he be assigned to continue his important work as Chief of the Latin American Section in this office. It would be very difficult for me to replace him, and I feel that the contacts he has made with the

FILE COPY

The Secretary of War - 2 -

July 3, 1942.

officers of the American Intelligence Command will greatly facilitate the close cooperation of this office with the War Department in the Latin American field.

I want also to recommend that Dr. Jones be commissioned with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. I believe that his professional standing, his long service as a reserve officer, and his continued interest in the work of the Intelligence Division after he became inactive qualify him for this grade. This grade would also compare more favorably with his civilian financial status.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan,  
Director.

WJDonovan/jwc

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

June 11, 1942

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I have just had the attached report from General Melcomb concerning the case of Captain Albert Henry Jenkins concerning which you wrote me recently.

Yours sincerely,

*Frank Knox*

Colonel William J. Donovan  
Coordinator of Information  
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure



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the c.

Even No. rel.

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON

*Inspector*

June 11, 1942

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I have just had the attached report from General  
Belmont concerning the case of Captain Albert Henry Jenkins  
concerning which you wrote me recently.

Yours sincerely,

*Franklin D. Roosevelt*

Colonel William J. Donovan  
Coordinator of Information  
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

REPLYING ADDRESS  
THE MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT  
AND REFER TO NO.

04177  
AF-316-ck

SO 6 6 433

HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON



5 June, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Subject: Application for reappointment to commissioned rank in the Marine Corps Reserve, case of former Captain Albert Henry Jenkins.

1. Mr. Jenkins's case has been referred to the Marine Corps Reserve Examining Board with the recommendation that he be reappointed in the Marine Corps Reserve in the rank of Captain for duty in the office of Colonel William J. Donovan, U. S. Army, Coordinator of Information.

T. HOLCOMB

May 26, 1942

The Honorable  
The Secretary of the Navy  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I respectfully request that Mr. Albert H. Jenkins be commissioned as a Major in the Marine Corps Reserve detailed to serve as instructor and liaison officer in our school for training special intelligence agents to give instructions particularly in the identification and description of military materiel.

At the outbreak of the last war Mr. Jenkins was an ensign in one of the University divisions. He was in active service in the Navy from 1917 to 1919, resigning in 1919 as a Lieutenant. During the war he did rifle range work and built and commanded a number of ranges, the largest one being that at Caldwell, New Jersey. After the war he built up a prosperous advertising business in New York. Since he had been trained as a chemical engineer he spent two years in Russia working in one of the plants of the Soviet Government for the construction of railway equipment. He reads and writes Russian practically as well as English.

In 1926 he entered the Marine Corps Reserve as a Captain and had various tours of active duty until 1936, when he resigned because of the pressure of his private business.

*Copy to Haysden 6/15*

-2-

I respectfully ask that he be given the rank of Major because the higher rank will greatly facilitate his liaison duties between the school and the armed forces. In view of his age and professional attainments he seems well qualified to be a Major.

Dr. Baker, who is now Executive Officer and chief instructor of the school, needs urgently the assistance which Mr. Jenkins can give him in administrative responsibility.

The granting of this request would greatly facilitate the work of our school.

Sincerely,

WJL:mc

William J. Donovan









J. H. Hayden

May 23, 1948

Colonel William J. Donovan

Request for Commissioning of Mr. Albert H. Jenkins  
as Major, Marine Corps Reserve, on detail to  
office of Coordinator

1. It is recommended that you request that Mr. Albert H. Jenkins be commissioned as a major in the Marine Corps Reserve and detailed to serve as instructor and liaison officer in our school for training special intelligence agents.

2. A special directive, probably from the Secretary of the Navy, would be required to commission Mr. Jenkins as a major because customarily a man who has been a reserve officer in the Marines will not be recommissioned at a higher rank than that which he held upon his separation from the Corps. Mr. Jenkins was a reserve captain from 1934 until 1936. I understand that the Marine Corps is ready to recommission him at that rank and that the preliminary steps have been taken. From 1917 to 1918 Mr. Jenkins was in active service in the Navy, resigning in 1919 as a lieutenant.

3. There are two reasons why the rank of major rather than that of captain is desired for Mr. Jenkins.

(a) The higher rank would greatly facilitate Mr. Jenkins' liaison efforts between the school and the armed forces. In age and professional attainments Mr. Jenkins seems qualified for appointment as a major.

(b) Mr. Jenkins' financial responsibilities cannot be met on a captain's pay.

J. R. Hayden

May 23, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan

Information concerning Mr. Albert H. Jenkins

1. In accordance with your request I am submitting information concerning Mr. Albert H. Jenkins in addition to that which is contained in the memorandum recommending that you request his appointment as a major in the Marine Corps Reserve and his detail to serve as instructor and liaison officer in our school for training special intelligence agents.

2. Mr. Jenkins was an ensign in one of the university divisions, Michigan Naval Militia, at the outbreak of the last war. At Great Lakes he was more or less shackled into rifle range work and was so successful that he was kept at it until after the war was over. He built and commanded a number of ranges, the last one being the great range at Caldwell, New Jersey, -- at the time, the largest range in the world. Mr. Jenkins' wartime service having been ashore rather than afloat, he entered the Marine Corps Reserve in 1918 as a captain and took over all the work, including various tours of active duty until 1926 when he resigned because of the pressure of his private business.

3. After the war, Mr. Jenkins built up a prosperous advertising business in New York. Trained as a chemical engineer, however, he spent two years in Russia working for the Soviet Government in one of their large plants for the construction of railway equipment. During this period he learned to speak Russian and reads and writes it practically as well as English.

4. Since 1934, Mr. Jenkins has been employed as one of the editors of "Labor", the weekly newspaper of the Standard Railroad Union. You doubtless know Mr. Edward Keating, the editor and manager, and of course, are aware that it represents a very conservative labor viewpoint. As far as I know, Mr. Jenkins has never been accused of "radicalism", or been under the adverse scrutiny of agencies who are interested in ferreting out people with communistic tendencies.



- 3 -

## Information concerning Mr. Albert H. Jenkins

5. Mr. Jenkins is a man of really extraordinary drive and ability. His training in the Navy and Marine Corps has given him a considerable knowledge of Naval and Military material. He was highly successful in directing instructions in small arms during the war, and as the commanding officer of large rifle ranges, has had administrative experience in the commanding of large groups of military personnel.

6. I believe that Mr. Jenkins is ideally equipped to develop the work of our S. I. School in the identification and description of military material, and to give instruction in this and other fields. He is also competent to assume administrative responsibility in connection with the School. Dr. Baker, who is now executive officer and chief instructor of the School, urgently needs the assistance which Mr. Jenkins will be able to give him.



IN REPLYING ADDRESS  
THE MARINE CORPS HEADQUARTERS  
AND REFER TO FILE  
04177-1  
AHC-357-wmt



*See*

HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON

October 28, 1942.

From: The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.  
To: The Director,  
Office of Strategic Services.  
Washington, D. C.  
  
Subject: Temporary promotion of Major Albert H. Jenkins,  
USMCR, for duty with the Office of Strategic  
Services.

1. It is requested that if and when the subject  
named officer is detached from the duty for which he was  
temporarily promoted to his present rank, this office, and  
the officer carrying his pay accounts, be so informed, as  
under the conditions of his appointment he will revert at  
that time to his permanent rank.

*L. Cronmiller, Jr.*  
L. CRONMILLER, JR.,  
By direction.

*File.*  
AUG 2 1947

My dear Colonel:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of July 31, 1942 requesting the temporary promotion of Captain Albert H. Jenkins.

I am informed by the Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps, that steps will be taken to effect the promotion of Captain Jenkins to Major after the findings of the Selection Board now in session have been approved by me.

Yours very truly,

*Frank Knox*

Colonel William J. Donovan  
Director  
Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, D. C.

F T C N F T C N SERVICE

July 31, 1942

The Honorable  
The Secretary of the Navy  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Captain Albert W. Jenkins, USMC, has been on duty with this office for the past two months, and is now the Executive Officer and instructor in military subjects at one of our special training schools. He has demonstrated unusual energy and capacity for hard and effective work.

Captain Jenkins was an officer in the Naval Reserve during the last war, and advanced from the grade of Ensign to Lieutenant/Senior Grade. For a period of ten years from 1926 through 1936 he held the rank of Captain in the Marine Corps Reserve.

It would appear that Captain Jenkins' previous service would entitle him to the rank of Major, and such rank would greatly increase his value to the

... of strategic services, but it is...  
 ... as one of the most important...  
 ... services. In addition it is anticipated that...  
 ... will be sent to England in the near future on an...  
 ... important mission and the increased grade would be of...  
 ... aid in his work there.

It is therefore respectfully recommended that  
 Captain Jenkins be advanced to the grade of Major, 1st Lt.

Yours very truly,

William J. Donovan  
 Director



MEMORANDUM

July 13, 1962

FROM: William J. Donovan

TO: Dr. J. R. Hayden

Would you please have Captain Jenkins prepare a proper form of letter to the Secretary of the Navy for the Colonel's signature asking that he be given a Majority.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES  
WASHINGTON

August 14, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan, Director  
Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Your letter of August 6, relative to the assignment of Captain William H. Jackson of the First Air Force to your organization for some special and confidential duties in London, has been received.

A number of graduates of the Air Intelligence School were assigned to the First Air Force upon their graduation August 8. I have been informed that Captain Jackson can therefore be released to you on the issuance of proper orders. I am taking the necessary steps to have those orders issued.

Sincerely,

*H. H. Arnold*  
H. H. ARNOLD

Lieutenant General, U.S.A.  
Commanding General, Army Air Forces



CONFIDENTIAL

August 6, 1942

General H. H. Arnold  
Commanding General, Army Air Forces  
War Department  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: A-2

Dear General Arnold:

I am attaching herewith copy of a letter which I wrote under date of August 6, 1942, to Major General James E. Chaney regarding the transfer to this organization of Captain William M. Jackson, Serial Number O-900440.

As you know General Chaney is temporarily absent from New York, and Major Bruce of my office discussed this matter today with Colonel Glenn, General Chaney's Chief of Staff, who stated to Major Bruce that the First Army Air Corps would be agreeable to this transfer, provided that a replacement would be assigned from the next class graduating from the Harrisburg School to replace Captain Jackson.

If A-2 would seek such a replacement, I would greatly appreciate their courtesy in the matter, as I am anxious to have Captain Jackson carry out some special

-2-

and confidential duties in our London office for which  
he is particularly qualified.

Respectfully yours,

William J. Donovan  
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
~~COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION~~

WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 28, 1942

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

FROM: David Bruce  
 TO: Colonel Donovan  
 SUBJECT: Captain William H. Jackson

*the superior is (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92) (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100)*

Captain William H. Jackson, Serial Number 0-900440, of the Army Air Corps, reported for duty on March 6, 1942. He is an Assistant S-2 at the headquarters of the First Bomber Command, 90 Church Street, New York City. His immediate superior is Lieutenant-Colonel Howard Moore, and the Commander of the First Bomber Command is Brigadier-General Larsen. The commanding officer of the First Air Force is Major-General Chaney.

You will recall that, when we were in London, we discussed with General Chaney the use of officers as Liaison with various British Service Intelligence and General Chaney agreed to it in principle.

Captain Jackson would be very glad to work for us, provided he was assured of being sent to London. It occurred to me that, in connection with the conversation that you were going to have with Colonel McDonald, Captain Jackson would be useful to act as



**SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

- 2 -

a second for McDonald. He is not doing a job at the present time at which he could not easily be replaced, and, if we line up McDonald, it would seem to me advisable to have Jackson go with him.

*D.B.*  
David Bruce

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 18, 1942

201--JUNESON, James E.  
(6-18-42)

Subject: Promotion.

To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. Under the provisions of Circular No. 161, War Department, May 26, 1942, it is recommended that:

<u>James E. Johnson</u>	<u>1st Lieutenant</u>	<u>O-314237</u>	<u>Infantry</u>
(Name)	(Grade)	(Serial No.)	(Arm or Service)

be promoted to the grade of Captain and that he remain on duty at his present assignment with the Coordinator of Information Service Unit (C.O.I.S.U.), Washington, D. C.

2. Lieutenant Johnson ranks from July 7, 1940. His assignment with the C. O. I. S. U. is of great importance and is in connection with the secret training and operating unit which has been approved by the Chief of Staff. He has clearly demonstrated to the satisfaction of his superiors the ability to perform the duties of the next higher grade. He has been assigned and performed the duties of the next higher grade for more than six months.

3. A position vacancy exists, and the promotion of this officer and those previously recommended will not exceed the authorized officer quota.

William J. Donovan  
Director

G. Edward Sutton  
Acting Director

7-26  
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR JOURNAL DE L'AVANCE:


The following is from Richard Rohman under date of February 25, 1942:

"The American labor movement is anxious to bring Leon Jouhaux, President of the French General Confederation of Labor, out of un-occupied France into the United States. M. Jouhaux is reluctant to leave his country, but his usefulness there to the Allied cause is virtually nil because of his prominence and because of constant surveillance.

"M. Jouhaux, from here, would prove invaluable to the Allied cause. On short-wave broadcasts to his own country and in many other connections, involving action as well as propaganda, his freedom would be a great asset to us.

"Can M. Jouhaux be brought out of France clandestinely? If not, could he be brought out of a neutral country, say, Switzerland or Spain? These questions are predicated on the certainty that Vichy France will not grant him an exit visa.

"Can your agency, or some other, arrange for M. Jouhaux's entry into the United States, provided his friends on the other side make possible the necessary first steps you may care to suggest? I shall be very much obliged if you will let me know the possibilities."

 COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION: FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH

- 2 -

I happened to see Mr. Bullitt, the former Ambassador to Paris, at luncheon. I asked him his opinion of M. Jouhaux. He described Jouhaux as "an old-fashioned trade union leader" and said that the old-line French trade unions were, after all "pretty good stuff". In Mr. Bullitt's opinion, while a trade union politician, he was 100% against the Axis. Moreover, he was a man of considerable intelligence, a lot of acumen, and, so far as Mr. Bullitt knew, he might be considered in the present situation as entirely reliable. Jouhaux had belonged to the more or less conservative right-wing of the labor movement and had resisted Communist control of French trade unions firmly. Jouhaux was extremely stubborn, however, had his own ideas and, incidentally, used to have a very good opinion of himself. In conclusion, Mr. Bullitt said at some time ago he had discussed "with certain people in Washington" the possibility of getting Jouhaux to the United States. He thought Jouhaux might be useful here.

  
John C. Wiley.

Copies to: Mr. Bruce  
Col. Solborg

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION: FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH

JOHNSON  
K. H. J.

TO: [illegible]  
FROM: [illegible]  
SUBJECT: [illegible]  
Reference: (a) [illegible]  
(b) [illegible]  
(c) [illegible]  
(d) [illegible]  
(e) [illegible]  
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(w) [illegible]  
(x) [illegible]  
(y) [illegible]  
(z) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

November 6, 1941

The Honorable  
The Secretary of the Navy  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It is requested that Lieutenant Leonard T. Jones, United States Coast Guard, recently transferred to you from the Treasury Department, be granted authorization to make a trip from Washington, D. C. to London, England and points within the British Isles on a confidential mission for the Coordinator of Information.

Lieutenant Jones will leave New York by Navy transportation on or about November 11, 1941, and will return to the United States on or about December 11, 1941.

We would appreciate your having the necessary Navy orders issued to cover the travel for Lieutenant Jones, allowing travel by plane, ship, or other carrier, including booster ferry service.

Reimbursement for the expense of the trip may be claimed from the Coordinator of Information upon presentation of an adjustment voucher by the Navy Department attaching a copy of the paid voucher for Lieutenant Jones.

Very truly yours,

William D. Donovan

W.D.



## COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

SECRET

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Richard Rohman

DATE June 2, 1942

TO: Mr. John C. Wiley

SUBJECT: Mr. Jeremias and Alfredo Segre

In connection with several of his proposed broadcasts to France, Prof. Paul Vignaux was turned over by F.I.S. in New York to a Mr. Jeremias as his collaborator. Mr. Jeremias frankly informed Prof. Vignaux that he is an adherent of the "Neu Beginnen" group, headed by Paul Hagen. Mr. Jeremias informed Prof. Vignaux that he was in charge of all labor broadcasts to all Europe.

Prof. Vignaux was disturbed by two facts: 1 - That an adherent of a small radical German political group should be in charge of this Agency's labor broadcasts to Europe via short-wave. Prof. Vignaux knew that the Hagen group had created considerable misgivings in Washington and he does not know how to proceed; 2 - Prof. Vignaux was equally disturbed by the fact that labor broadcasts to all of Europe have been entrusted to a German, no matter how blameless an individual that German might be. Prof. Vignaux felt that European workers listening to the radio at the risk of their lives were entitled to broadcasts guided by men, above reproach, of their own nationality.

The incident of Mr. Jeremias followed closely upon the admission by F.I.S. that it has employed an Italian by the name of Alfredo Segre (not to be confused with Massimo Segre). Segre was expelled from the Mazzini Society when he openly approved the Russian invasion of Finland for the first time. Segre had alarmed the Mazzini Society by pursuing the Communist line shortly before the invasion of Finland and he has been doing the same since his expulsion from the Society. In the interval, according to one reliable report, Segre has married a girl employee of the "Daily Worker". Segre was brought from the West Coast for a job in the Radio Section of the Office of Coordinator of Information.

R.R.

RR:al

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION  
270 MADISON AVENUE  
NEW YORK

February 6, 1942

Colonel Arthur V. McDermott  
Director, Selective Service  
1 East 40th Street  
New York, N. Y.

My dear Colonel McDermott:

I am sending you herewith the proper forms  
for draft deferment in the case of Mr. Ed Johnson.

Mr. Johnson is in charge of a highly  
specialized and technical operation which involves the expert  
monitoring of all foreign short wave broadcasts, the training  
of personnel for that work, and the writing of reports based  
upon the short wave material. The type of work he does is so  
highly unique that to lose him would constitute a serious inter-  
ference with our short wave activities. For this reason, I want  
to make this urgent request for favorable consideration to be  
given to the deferment application.

I shall greatly appreciate anything you can  
do in the matter.

Yours very truly,

WJH:JH  
Enc.

William J. Donovan

**SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM**21ST STREET AND C STREET N W  
WASHINGTON, D C

APR 25 1942

IN REPLYING ADDRESS  
THE DIRECTOR OF SELECTIVE SERVICE  
AND REFER TO NO

11-4,24-112

*Kell*State Director of Selective Service  
State Office Building  
Richmond, VirginiaSubject: Earl E. Jensen  
Local Board No. 2  
Arlington County, Va.

Dear Colonel Reale:

We have been advised by the Coordinator of Information that it is desired to send the above-named registrant, who is a key employee of that Office, on an assignment which would require that he leave the United States.


The activities of the Office of the Coordinator of Information may be considered as necessary in the prosecution of the war effort. Will you kindly request the registrant's local board to give serious consideration to an exceptional classification for the subject registrant unless he is already so classified or is in Class III or IV. Also please request that they immediately issue their permit for the registrant to leave the country.

In the issuance of permits, it is suggested the following form be observed. In the first paragraph, insert above the words "Designate period of absence" the words "Temporary". In answer to No. 1, 2, and 3, insert "No and Unquestionable."

The permit covering the above registrant should be mailed to the Office of the Coordinator of Information, Washington, D. C.

For The Director,

G. H. BAKER

Walter Donovan  
Coordinator of InformationGORDON H. BAKER  
Major, Specialist  
Chief, Inspection Division

April 18, 1942

Brig. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey  
Director, National Selective  
Service System  
21st and C Streets, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Hershey:

One of my key employees, Earl E. Jensen,  
is being sent abroad on a special assignment.

Sometime ago, a letter was directed to  
Local Board No. 2, Arlington County, Virginia,  
asking that permission to leave the country be  
granted Mr. Jensen. The Board replied that addi-  
tional information, including itinerary and the  
nature of his duties, would be required before the  
request could be considered and if this information  
could not be disclosed that Col. Mills F. Neal,  
State Director of Selective Service, would be the  
proper person to contact. Col. Neal, in turn,  
informed me that the request should be made direct  
to National Headquarters of Selective Service.

It is respectfully requested that  
permission to leave the country for an indefinite  
period be granted this individual.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Hanovan  
Coordinator

January 14, 1948

Dear Senator Johnson:

Thank you for your letter of January 6.

I have a good many doubts regarding the effectiveness of this scheme. One of the difficulties is that it is a game which two can play. Germany's economic controls and rationing restrictions are so nearly complete that even a large increase in the amount of money, legal or counterfeit, held by the German people would have a comparatively small inflationary effect. Civilian spending in Germany is determined predominantly by allowable rations and other direct restrictions rather than by the amount of money at the disposal of consumers.

In Great Britain, although rationing and other controls have assumed increased importance, there are large groups of the population whose spending would be increased if, say, large quantities of counterfeit British bank notes were dropped by German planes over British cities. For this reason and others, this suggestion seems to me a dangerous one to try out on Germany.

Even though I am skeptical of the usefulness of this particular suggestion, I fully share your view that all schemes, including apparently "crack pot" ones, deserve careful examination in these times.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Martin C. Johnson  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

William M. Donovan

Murphy:Ray



## INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Edile Despres

DATE January 9, 1942

TO: Dr. James P. Baxter

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator E. C. Johnson (Colorado) to  
Colonel Donovan


The proposal to flood Germany with counterfeit marks is not a new one. It is usually suggested that the counterfeit money be dropped from planes over German cities in large quantities. It does not seem to me a promising proposal.

The idea underlying the scheme is that Germans coming into possession of these counterfeit marks, indistinguishable from legal currency, would rush to convert them into goods, and that this increased flow of expenditure would produce a violent inflation and weaken Germany's war effort. Of the criticisms of this proposal, the most important is that it is a game which two could play. Economic controls in Germany are more complete and effective than in any other belligerent country, and the civilian's expenditures for goods and services are almost entirely divorced from the volume of money at his disposal. Rationing and other restrictions, rather than the amount of money on hand, set the effective upper limit to civilian spending. Thus, it is doubtful that even a marked increase in the amount of money, legal or counterfeit, in German hands would have any substantial effect on the German economy. This is less clearly the case in Great Britain, where a considerable proportion of the working class has insufficient money income to purchase the food permitted to them under existing rations.

Attached is a suggested draft of a reply to Senator Johnson.

ED

Attachment



RECEIVED  
JAN 10 1942  
U.S. SENATE  
OFFICE OF THE CLERK  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER  
DIRECTOR, FBI

# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

*D. F. Fisher*

January 6, 1942

Col. Wm. J. Donovan  
Coordinator of Information  
25th & F -- North Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Col. Donovan:

One of my constituents who is a very able publisher of a Colorado newspaper has advanced a novel secret weapon to be used against Hitler.

At first blush, it seems like another "Crack pot" proposal, but as one thinks it through, he is impressed with its possibilities.

Briefly, it is this: Flood Germany with counterfeit German marks.

What do you think of it?

Sincerely,

*E. E. Johnson*

EEJ:MMW



*Donovan's*

January 21, 1942

Mr. G. F. Allen, Chief Disbursing Officer  
Treasury Department  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Miss Johnson

Dear Mr. Allen:

Reference is made to my letter of December 15, 1941, advising that A. Rex Johnson has been authorized to sign as certifying officer for all expense vouchers and vouchers for advance of funds for employees of this office.

This is to advise that Dr. A. Rex Johnson is no longer associated with the Office of the Coordinator of Information, and the authority granted in my letter of December 15th is hereby revoked.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

*WJD*  
JAN 22 1942

X  
December 15, 1941

Mr. A. F. Allen,  
Chief Disbursing Officer,  
Treasury Department,  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Miss Johnson

Dear Mr. Allen:

This is to advise that A. Rex Johnson has  
been authorized to sign as certifying officer for  
all expense vouchers and vouchers for advance of  
funds for employees of this office.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

wj:ad

*Col. [illegible]*

## COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Sherman Kent

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE 28 March 1942

SUBJECT: Mr. Goodhue Livingston, Jr.

Mr. Goodhue Livingston, Jr., who called your office from Florida, was connected with me in your absence.

Mr. Livingston has had a considerable experience in South Africa and is anxious to return there as a representative of this office. He was an officer in the last war, has had a great deal of experience in New York politics, and is now holding an important post in the New York Public Health Service. In the light of these experiences and his knowledge of the country he feels qualified for any sort of observational work which this office might commission him to do.

He will return from Florida in about a week and has told me that he will call my office upon arrival in Washington. I am sending Lieutenant McBaine a copy of this memorandum and am asking him if he would be so kind as to see that Mr. Livingston sees the interested persons.

*Sherman Kent*

Sherman Kent, Chief  
Mediterranean Section

cc—Lt. Turner McBaine  
Major David Bruce  
Col. Robert A. Solborg  
Mr. H. Dorsey Newson  
Mr. Conyers Read

December 29, 1941

Mr. Goodhue Livingston, Jr.  
125 North Street  
New York, N. Y.

My dear Mr. Livingston:

Doctor Sherman Kent of this office is going to be in New York today, and I believe he will call you up in connection with your suggestion that someone in this office interview your brother-in-law, Owen D. Johnson. Doctor Kent is an expert on Morocco himself, and I am sure will be very interested in talking with Mr. Johnson.

Colonel Donovan has asked me to reply to your letter of December 22 and to say that he is sorry to tell you that at the present time there is no opening here wherein we can avail ourselves of your services. This organization is made up of a small administrative staff comprised of a number of specialists in certain limited fields, and we do not at the present time need additional staff.

Colonel Donovan asked me to tell you that he appreciated the way you feel about wanting to help in the present emergency, and he only wishes that he could offer you something here.

Yours sincerely,

Kenneth Mygatt  
Assistant to Colonel Donovan

Enclosure (2)



123 WORTH STREET  
NEW YORK CITYTELEPHONE  
WORTH 2 8900

GOODHUE LIVINGSTON, JR.

December 22nd  
1941

*For Tugwell*

Col. William J. Donovan,  
Coordinator of Information,  
25th St. & F Street, N. W.,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:-

My brother-in-law, Owen D. Johnson, age 24, a graduate of St. Paul's School, Concord, New Hampshire, after spending two years at Yale University, went out to Morocco three years ago and has been living there ever since. He returned to this country within the last week and expects to join the United States Army shortly.

Yesterday I had quite a talk with him regarding general conditions in Morocco and it occurred to me that it might be worthwhile for some member of your staff to have an informatory talk with him regarding Moroccan conditions. He has been in close association with many Arabs of importance and naturally, has picked up a certain amount of Arabic. He knows definitely where certain air fields are located because he has seen them. He seems to know where other air fields are located from information he has heard.

I have asked him to write down, within the next few days, in as short and concise a manner as possible, all the information which might be of use, heading it under three titles, military, economic, and political. If you believe it is worthwhile for some member of your bureau to talk with him, I can arrange to have him come to Washington immediately after New Year's, or even before. It occurred to me that possibly his information checked against other information which you and G-2 probably have, might be of value. I have written to Brigadier General Sherman Miles along the same lines.


Incidentally, if you are looking for additional assistants in your Bureau, I would like to be considered. I seem to be rather an old man in Army eyes, being nearly forty-five, but I served in the regular Army in the last war in the 15th Field Artillery, 2nd Division, going through all actions with them until wounded in July, 1918. After leaving the hospital, I was assigned to a rather confidential job in General Harbord's office in Tours and then was attached to Army Intelligence in Paris, my primary job being in charge of the passport office as well as the Intelligence Police operating in the various social service agencies such as the American Red Cross, the YMCA, etc.

Col. William J. Donovan

2.

Since then, the only other thing I have done that might have some bearing on this type of work, besides holding some administrative business jobs, the last one being Secretary of the Department of Health of the City of New York, is the fact that I spent two years in the Rhodesias and south Africa. This particular part of the world is somewhat removed, for the time being, from military operations but it seems possible that in time it may very well become important.

Sincerely,



Goodhue Livingston, Jr.

rmc



✓  
December 26, 1941

Dear Colonel Donovan,

DEC 26 1941

This was sent to me  
at the request of Dr. Chaim Wogman.

Henry Field

Outside Edges of green  
card indicate the edges of  
the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is  $\frac{1}{25}$  @ f.6.3

42 East 48th St.  
New York, N. Y.

## A JEWISH MILITARY FORCE

to Serve Under British Command in the Defense of  
Palestine and the Middle East

Summary Statement on the History and Present Status of the Project  
(December, 1941)

1. The desire of the Jewish people to place a military force in the field to fight with the British against the common enemy, is based on the elementary human right of self-defense. The same right is being exercised by Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Free French and others who are fighting under British command under their own flags and insignia. The Jews are at a loss to understand why this right should be denied to them. They feel they have a special claim to it in view of the fact that they were the first people to be singled out by the common enemy for persecution and terror. The Jews regard it a matter of right and honor to meet that challenge as Jews.

2. The present demand for a Jewish military force to fight for the defense of Palestine is not without precedent. A similar force was created during the first World War. Popularly known as the Jewish Legion, it consisted of the Zion Transport Corps, which served in the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, and, later, of the 38th, 39th, 40th and 42nd Battalions of the Royal Fusiliers, E.E.F., which saw active service in the Palestine Campaign under General Allenby in 1917. The majority of the thousands of men who enlisted for the Jewish

Legion came from countries other than Palestine, many of them from the United States, the Jewish population of Palestine being at that time less than 60,000. Today that population exceeds half a million, and is prepared to furnish an army of about three divisions or approximately 50,000 men.

3. No objection, moreover, on technical political grounds can be sustained against the proposal. Under the terms of the Mandate the Jewish National Home is to all intents and purposes a recognized political entity. Its blue-and-white banner is its flag. Its language, Hebrew, is one of the official languages of the country. Recognition is also accorded to its representative body, the Jewish National Council (Vaad Leumi). Another body, the Jewish Agency, is recognized by the Mandatory Power as representing the interests of the Jewish people at large in the National Home. A Jewish military force, recruited primarily in the National Home, is entitled to the same status as the units representing Free France, Free Belgium, or any of the other European nations that are fighting the common enemy.

4. On August 29, 1939, when war between Germany and Britain appeared imminent, the leaders of the World Zionist Movement, pursuant to action taken by the Zionist Congress held earlier that month in Geneva, presented to Prime Minister Chamberlain a proposal for the formation of Jewish military units within the British army for the defense of Palestine and the Middle East and for service wherever required. The reply was courteous by non-committal. As soon as war broke



out, the responsible leaders of the Palestine Jewish Community called upon their people to register as volunteers for war services. The call was answered by 136,000 men and women out of a population numbering slightly over half a million. The Palestine Government expressed appreciation of this response but availed itself of it only to a very limited extent.

5. The first offer of the Government was enlistment in two Jewish-Arab units of non-combatant pioneers, a form of service for which the Jews did not ask; and even that on condition that the number of Jews to be accepted was not to exceed the number of Arabs who might enlist. Eventually, the combatant services were also opened to them. Since the keenness for enlistment among the Arabs was not very great, the principle of parity restricted the number of Jewish volunteers to a small fraction of those who were available. The parity restriction was subsequently relaxed, but only with respect to the non-combatant units. Nevertheless, in spite of the restrictions, nearly 12,000 Jews are now serving with the British forces, and recruitment is continuing. These men have participated in military operations in France, Lybia, Eritrea, Abyssinia, Greece, Crete and Syria. They have rendered honorable service and have been cited for gallantry by General Wavell, General Ball and Vice Air Marshall B'Albiac among others.

6. When in the summer of 1940 the Chamberlain Government was replaced by that of Churchill, the Zionist leaders again

presented their proposal for a Jewish military force to fight with Britain under its own flag and insignia. In September of that year the offer received the explicit approval of the Government. Preparations were started and the indications were that a formidable Jewish fighting force would soon come into existence. In March 1941, however, a letter came from the Colonial Secretary stating that, owing to lack of equipment, the project would be delayed for six months, with the assurance, nevertheless, that the postponement was not to be construed as a reversal of the previous decision. Towards the end of the six-months postponement another communication from the Colonial Secretary was received, again postponing action but offering to reconsider the proposal in three months. The same reason - technical difficulties - was given for the new postponement. Naturally, the plan involved a number of technical problems - training centers, transportation, equipment - and since those problems would always exist, the Zionist leaders pressed for a definite decision. The reply which came on October 15, was a virtual retraction of the promise made in September 1940 and repeated in March 1941.

7. The technical difficulty which has been officially cited as responsible for the abandonment by the Government of the plan for a Jewish military force is "a lack of equipment" (statement by Lord Moyne, Secretary for Colonies, in House of Lords, November 25th, 1941). According to all the reports however, that lack is being effectively supplied by ever-increasing shipments of American lease-lend material to the

Near East. Mr. Churchill has stated that a force of 750,000 men has been equipped for the new Libyan offensive in which Czech, Polish and other units representing nations conquered by Nazi Germany are fighting under their own flags. In so huge an army room and equipment could have been found for two or three divisions representing the Jewish National Home. Surely American lend-lease material is not being shipped with the proviso that it may be used to equip the units of all peoples with the exception of the Jews. Moreover, even the lack of equipment need not have delayed the formation of a Jewish military force. The new American army has been created in spite of such a lack: soldiers in maneuvers have frequently had to use token weapons; and after Dunkirque many men in the new armies raised in Britain went through their drills for a time with broomsticks.

5. Outstanding American leaders have supported the demand for a Jewish military force. At a public meeting held in Carnegie Hall November 1, 1941, Senator Alben W. Barkley, Majority Leader of the U. S. Senate, said:

"Already thousands of them (the young Jews of Palestine) have joined the ranks of the fighters of freedom and they have been serving on many fronts: in Lybia, in Ethiopia, in Greece and in Syria, and their gallantry has won the praise of their commanders. But there are many thousands more who are anxious to be admitted into those ranks to fight with the British as a Jewish army under their own flag, even as the armies of the conquered nations, the

Free French, the Czechs, the Poles, and others are fighting. I trust that the aspirations for the establishment of a Jewish army in defense of liberty may be realized."

Senator Robert F. Wagner, as Chairman of the American Palestine Committee, a body comprising some 700 outstanding non-Jewish leaders in every sphere of American life, has stated:

"As an important bastion of the allied front, the Jews of Palestine should be allowed to place a substantial military force in the field of fight with the other defenders of freedom in the Middle East. It is to be regretted that the repeated offers of such a force made by the Jewish community in Palestine have not yet been accepted."

In England the proposal for a Jewish Army in the Middle East has had notable support, including that of the Manchester Guardian and of the London Times. An editorial in the Manchester Guardian of November 10th, 1941 called the failure of the negotiations for a Jewish military force "a disturbing story" and urged that Britain should welcome Jewish troops with the British forces under their own flag. The London Times pointed out that the Jewish volunteers had rendered good service in Greece, Libya and Syria although in the citations these Jews were described only as Palestinians.

9. The failure to grant the Jews of Palestine the elementary right of self-defense and the Jewish people generally the right to vindicate their honor against their ruthless oppressor, should be considered in the light of the general policy with respect to the Jewish National Home pursued by the British Government since 1939. That policy, embodied in

the White Paper issued that year by the Chamberlain Government, denies the Jews the two rights that are indispensable to the development of their National Home, the right of immigration and the right of land purchase. In the Parliamentary debate on May 23rd, 1939, Mr. Winston Churchill characterized that policy as a "repudiation" of the Balfour Declaration. "As one intimately and responsibly concerned in the earlier stages of that policy," he said, "I could not stand by and see solemn engagements into which Britain has entered before the world set aside for reasons of administrative convenience or - and it will be a vain hope - for the sake of a quiet life."

10. The White Paper policy was motivated by a desire to appease the Arab terrorist who, under the leadership of the former Mufti of Jerusalem, now at last conducting his activities from Rome and Berlin, were instigated and financed by the Axis. Appeasement, however, has been a failure in the Near East, as it has been everywhere else. It has failed to secure for Great Britain the support of the Arab world, whose attitude to the democratic cause has ranged from indifference and lukewarmness, as in the case of Egypt, to disaffection and rebellion, as in the case of Iraq. Jewish rights in Palestine are not an important factor in the attitude of the Arab countries towards Britain and the democratic cause. That attitude is, in the case of each of them, determined by its local interests. The democratic tradition among the Arabs is primitive and weak



and the British cause among them would gain vastly more by British determination than by the policy of appeasement and surrender represented by the repudiation of Jewish rights in Palestine.

11. The war has made it clear that the only element able and willing to contribute substantial strength to Britain in the Near East is the Palestine Jewish Community. The fact confirms the contention not only of Zionists but of many farsighted Englishmen, that a strong Jewish Palestine is vital for the stabilization of the Middle East and the protection of the Suez Canal. While the Jews have laid emphasis on their desire to contribute their full military share to the common cause, Jewish Palestine has proved also an important agricultural and industrial asset to the British war effort.

12. In a speech in London on November 9, 1941, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization said: "For a long time we have been pressing the demand for a Jewish fighting force in which the Jew could enlist as a Jew for service in the British forces under a Jewish name and flag.... Passing to the last chapter, I am unable to record anything except disappointment and frustration...The Jews have been penalized for their loyalty and devotion. It is apparently felt that the Jews do not require encouragement and may be refused the right of every nation to a name and a flag."

"It is bitter for me to say this," Dr. Weizmann concluded, "but we do not lose hope nor do we renounce the claim for a



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Jewish fighting force serving under its own standard." Addressing himself finally to the Palestine Jews, Dr. Weizmann said: "Enlist in ever-growing numbers! Work and fight, even if nameless...Whatever others do to us, we must not default in our duty to the common cause."

December 8, 1941

Mr. David Ben-Gurion  
Emergency Committee for Zionist  
Affairs  
41 East 42nd Street  
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Ben-Gurion:

Many thanks for sending me

the memorandum on the Jewish War

Effort and War Offers.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

CC  
Jews 1043

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Dr. Walter L. Wright, Jr.

DATE December 11, 1941

TO: Mr. James P. Baxter, 3rd

SUBJECT: Comments on a memorandum regarding the Zionist affairs sent to Colonel Donovan by Mr. David Ben-Gurion

This memorandum deals with negotiations of the Jewish Agency representing the Zionist-Jewish colony in Palestine with the British government regarding the Agency's proposal to form a Jewish army in the Near East.

The aim of the memorandum is to convince the reader that Jews in Palestine and elsewhere in the world are being denied an opportunity to fight against the Axis, and in particular against Hitler's forces, by a British government which is prejudiced against Jews in general. The facts are, however, as brought out in this memorandum, that the British government welcomes loyal Jewish volunteers, and has some 12,000 of them already in service; that the British government refuses the offer of an army of 50 to 60,000 Zionist colonists from Palestine who are said to be available, if trained and equipped by Britain and authorized to fight under their own flag. The real question is, therefore, whether Britain is prepared to accept the implications of recognizing a Zionist army with its own flag. The memorandum makes clear that such recognition implies a status for the Zionist army and agency equivalent to that of the Polish, Czech, Free French, and other "exile" governments and armies, all of which represent nations with inviolable claims to territory. Consequently, if the British government accepts the Zionist offer of an army, the recognition of a Zionist state in Palestine is clearly implied.

Rather than discuss in detail the specific statements of the memorandum, I am attaching a copy of the sketch of the Zionist question which I have just finished preparing. If further comment on the memorandum of Mr. Ben-Gurion is desired, I should be glad to furnish it.

*Walter L. Wright, Jr.*



To Col. Donoran.

Wright's attached Memo:  
"Zionism -- Aims and Prospects"  
is well worth reading.  
Jim

JAMES P. DAZZLE, 3rd

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### ZIONISM--AIMS AND PROSPECTS

The World Zionist Organization is pressing the British Government to arm Zionists in Palestine and send them into battle against Hitler under their own flag. Churchill and his advisers have not yet done this, so the Zionists have begun to exert pressure on Britain through stirring up Jewish and gentile public opinion. After all, what could be more appropriate than Jewish volunteers fighting on the front against Hitlerism? Some 80,000 Zionist volunteers are said to be available in Palestine, precisely where Britain has the greatest need of troops, where Arabs are flirting with Axis promises, where loyalty to the Empire is at a premium. Why does Churchill hesitate?

Outstanding among reasons for Churchill's hesitation is the demand for use of a Zionist flag. Use of Zionist groups fighting under their own flag would imply recognition of a Zionist state. Zionist leaders speciously assert that the "exile" governments of today are in a somewhat similar position. But Britain is not at the moment ready to settle the Zionist problem in this backdoor way, although the history of British diplomacy in Palestine could provide examples of equally oblique dealings. Britain must consider the reactions to be expected among Arabs and Indians. The United States must also be consulted. If the peace ending this war is to

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last longer than the peace of Versailles it must have strong American backing, and Americans are suspicious of commitments made by Britain in the heat of battle. At Paris in 1919 we had unfortunate experience of this sort of thing. The British are not forgetting our disillusionment and the consequent era of isolationism. If the Near East is to have peace, the Zionist problem must somehow be set on the road to solution. Sooner or later the United States will have to establish a policy of its own regarding Zionism. If we allow matters to drift we will end up as supporters of whatever policy or policies the British Government may adopt. Meanwhile, Palestinian Jews who are more concerned with defeating Hitler than in establishing a Zionist state are welcomed as volunteers and to their honor it should be noted that 10,000 are already serving with the Imperial Forces.

In formulating a policy on the problem of Zionism we must first define our objective: We presumably desire a relatively permanent settlement in the Near East. This must meet the "legitimate" as distinguished from the "illegitimate" interests and ambitions of the peoples and governments involved. Assuming that the Axis will eventually be defeated, the interests and ambitions to be considered will be those of the Arabs, the Zionist Jews, the British Empire, and the French Empire.



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The French Empire in the Near East has already in appearance achieved practical liquidation by recognition of independent Syrian and Lebanese Republics, although it still remains to be seen whether this independence, which is subject to the condition that the "paramount interests" of France will be protected, is real or fictitious.

Hispanism should first be examined from the point of view of Jews in general. Jews living in Axis-dominated Europe are frantically seeking havens of refuge. Their first choice of refuge is usually the United States, their second a British possession far distant from Europe, their third South America, and their fourth Palestine. Only because Palestine seems to be somewhat less inaccessible than other lands have many Jews turned in that direction. Their numbers may run into the millions--far greater numbers than Palestine could support, even if Transjordan were annexed and the Arab population expelled.

Jews outside of Axis-dominated Europe regard Palestine as their spiritual homeland, a land to which they are as much attached as Americans of pre-Revolutionary Scotch-Irish ancestry are to Ulster, whence their forebears came to the United States. Not only a small minority are sufficiently determined in opinion to contribute toward its program, just as

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gentiles contribute toward Christian missionary work. A small but exceedingly active group of zealots head the Zionist organizations and conduct their superb propaganda, performing the same functions as Church missionary boards. But very few Jews from the United States have been willing to settle permanently in Palestine, perhaps 5,000 out of 500,000 Zionist colonists.

Many American and European Jews have foreseen the danger to their people of a Jewish nationalist movement and have therefore opposed Zionism. Zionist propaganda intended for gentile consumption gives the impression that the Zionist program is supported by all the Jews of the world, whereas it actually represents the desire of a small but active minority. Zionist appeals directed toward a Jewish audience are often pathetic in their attempts to interest the vast unconverted majority of Jews. Anti-Semitismists have pointed out that the Zionist movement gives color to the suspicion that Jews are not loyal citizens of the countries in which they live but are secretly disloyal.

Yet the Zionist dream-state in Palestine cannot successfully solve the problem facing the Jews of the world. Palestine is too small and barren even for the Jews of Eastern and Central Europe who might be willing to settle there. That many Jews from the United States or England or France or Holland or even a non-Nazi Germany would go there unless

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forceably deported is most improbable. If Judaism is to become under Zionist leadership a new nationalism, rather than a religion, it can expect no better fate than that of other social groups which have competed with the centralized modern state, an organization which tolerates only with reluctance and suspicion even the mildest forms of divided loyalty.

Furthermore, the world Jewish community is actually a religious, not a cultural unity, for Jews have no common language, no common way of life. Hebrew is no more widely used among Jews than Latin among Catholic Christians, and in Zionist Palestine heroic efforts have been necessary to produce a renaissance of spoken Hebrew. Wherever Jews possess any semblance of cultural unity, as distinguished from the Christians or Moslems among whom they live, this unity is something forced upon them by persecution and segregation. Even the Jews expelled from Germany by Hitler remain essentially Germans in thought and feeling as well as in language. The future of Judaism would seem to lie in development as a religious community along the lines followed by Christian sects. Political Zionism on any scale greater than that of a new Luxembourg is almost certain to have tragic results for world Jewry.

The Arab world, in contrast with the Jewish, constitutes a cultural unity, extending from Morocco to Iraq, from the

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northern borders of Turkey to Aden and Muscat. But this cultural unity does not imply complete cultural uniformity. The Arabic language of newspapers and books is not spoken anywhere, but bears a relationship to spoken dialects similar to that of medieval Latin to the Italian of Dante. Yet literary Arabic is very definitely a living language, understood and used by all literate Arabs, not declining in use or giving way to written versions of the widely varying Arabic dialects spoken in Morocco, Egypt, or Iraq. Social conditions in the Arab world differ as widely as dialects. The nomads of Ibn Saud's Arabian Kingdom would seem to have little in common with the highly educated urban classes of Cairo and Damascus. Yet the urban Arab is so familiar with the literary tradition derived from nomad life that he feels no further removed from the Beduin than the New Yorker is from the Texas rancher. The universal literary language, the universal familiarity with Arab tradition, and the almost universal religion of Islam are potent forces today. The unity of the Arab world is no less real because it is not the type of unity with which we are familiar in modern European states. This unity expresses itself in the vague and inchoate movement called Pan-Arabism. There is no Pan-Arab political organization, yet the French and Spanish rulers of Morocco have to reckon with the same Arab and Moslem susceptibilities regarding Palestine and Zionism as the British overlords of

India. In Egypt the strong local nationalism is organized in the predominant Wafd Party, which includes the vast majority of both Moslem and Coptic Christian elements in the population. In Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq there are still too many divisive factors for strong local nationalisms to develop, but beginnings are apparent and growth inevitable.

The non-Jewish population of Palestine is Arab in language and predominantly Moslem in religion. The Jews resident in the country before Zionist colonies were established numbered not over 60,000 and were culturally assimilated to their Arab neighbors. The Arabs are far more purely Semitic than the Jews, have been in Palestine for well over a thousand years and regard the country as theirs by immemorial right. They are as unwilling to be ousted to make room for Zionist colonists as are the farmers of New York State to clear out on behalf of the Indian Five Nations. Jerusalem is a holy city to Moslems, second in sanctity only to Mecca and Medina. Abraham is the traditional ancestor, through his son Ishmael, of all Arabs, and Moses is honored by Moslems as a forerunner of Mohammed. The attitude of Moslems in general toward Jews is one of contemptuous tolerance. The Jews of Mohammed's day rejected him just as they had rejected Christ six centuries earlier.

The Zionist colonists are to native Palestinians and to Arabs everywhere not simply followers of a despised religion; they are the most despised type of imperialists. They do not

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always govern the country directly, although Sir Herbert Samuel was a Jewish governor, but they have the backing of the British Empire. They come with all the economic and industrial techniques of western civilization into a traditional medieval society of large landowners, of peasants and artisans. They enjoy financial backing which appears to the Arabs to be unlimited. Much money has been spent in buying land, from which Arab peasants were evicted to make room for Zionist agricultural colonies. That this land is then made more productive only serves to intensify the bitterness of the evicted peasants, who imagine that they could do as well if they had the necessary capital. Arab landowners, politicians, and professional men watch with alarm the increase of Jewish population and emigration, as do the Zionists themselves, a not very distant future when the majority of possible voters in the country will be Jews. Thus the Arab upper classes, who have often profited by land sales to Zionists, have joined the peasants in opposition to Zionism, for they fear that one day they will be a minority dominated by a heavily nationalistic Jewish majority operating through the respectable machinery of democracy. So great is this fear that Moslems and Christians have shelved traditional enmities and united in opposition to Zionism. Since Zionist immigration has been forced on an unwilling country by Britain, the British Government is hated almost as violently as the Zionists themselves, and the names of Balfour and Lloyd George are



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Arabs living outside of Palestine share the feelings of Palestinians toward Jews, and regard their fellow Arabs with warm sympathy, even to the extent of contributing funds for anti-Zionist use. Arabs everywhere cherish the dream of seeing established some day a Pan-Arab Federation, including all of the Arabic-speaking peoples. They resent the prospect of a Zionist wedge cutting off the Arabs of Africa from those of Asia and dividing permanently into two parts Syria and Palestine, which are a single natural geographical and economic unit. Wherever the Arabic language is spoken Arabs regard the British support of Zionism in Palestine, no matter how insufficient this support may seem to ardent Zionists, as an injustice and as evidence that Britain is no friend to Arabs in general. They remember how Great Powers have repeatedly exploited Oriental minorities, Slavs, Armenians and Arabs, for their own imperial advantage. Axis propagandists are exploiting skillfully this anti-British and anti-Jewish feeling, which is shared by non-Arab Moslems even in India.

The British Government and Public are involved in a mass of conflicting promises and sympathies. Balfour and Lloyd George promised the Jews of the world a "National Home" in Palestine and did this partly to obtain Zionist support during the last World War. At almost the same time, responsible British officials, such as Balfour and Lawrence for example, were making vague but far-reaching promises to Arab leaders, such as the late King Faysal of the Hijaz. Arab states were to be

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served out of the old Ottoman Empire and "self-determination" was to be encouraged, and at that time Palestine was almost solidly Arab. With Arab, not Zionist, military help the Turks were driven out of Palestine, and after the war an uneasy balance of semi-independent Arab states was set up under the mandates system. Unfulfilled promises to the Arabs have plagued British (and French) statesmen ever since, and Palestine has been the most poisonous focus of Arab discontent and rebellion, for there the Zionists were steadily increasing, while the government, although supposed to be a Class I Mandate, remained as unrepresentative of the people as that of any crown colony.

Anti-British feeling among the Arabs is now so bitter that they either are pro-Axis or seem so. The head of the Palestinian Arabs, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, is in Berlin.

British imperialists have appreciated the advantage of holding Palestine as a buttress to the Suez Canal and have thought desirable a nicely balanced mixture of quarrelling populations. Some of the British public have thought the Jews entitled to monopolize the country. Others have sympathized with the Arabs. Still others have opposed both Jews and Muslims on the ground that Palestine is most appropriately the homeland of Christians. The British Government has had no consistent policy toward Zionism, unless confusion and contradiction can constitute a policy. No better example of inability can be found.

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The Axis Governments are using British support of Zionism as a trenchant weapon in attacking the British Empire. Nazi anti-Semitism is sufficiently demonstrated to convince all Arabs that the Axis would make short shrift of Zionism in Palestine. Axis propaganda implies that Axis defeat of Britain would result in Arab independence--an implication which we are at liberty to doubt, for a victorious Germany, "thinking with its blood," is hardly likely to distinguish between Arab Semite and Jewish Semite. Meanwhile Arabs regard Britain as the immediate enemy and count on their own skill and luck to gain at least some advantages from her collapse.

The United States Government and non-Jewish Public have given little serious attention to Zionism. Support of it has often seemed a good way to express sympathy for the persecuted Jewry of Europe. The Jew has been the underdog; he thinks apparently that Zionism is what he wants; let him have it. The propaganda machine of the World Zionist Movement has done a superb job of exploiting the readiness of American public figures to endorse "good causes." Jews prominent in American life who sympathize with Zionism have encouraged gentile friends to do likewise. In the American press much space has been devoted to the Zionist case, while little or none has been given to the case of the Arabs or to the contradictions of British policy. We have not realized

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that only about 250,000 of the 4,500,000 Jews of the United States are active supporters of Zionism, and that many Zionist spokesmen are not even naturalized. Zionist propaganda strives to have it appear that Anti-Zionism, which is actually opposition to a synthetic political program, is exactly equivalent to Anti-Semitism, a cultural perversion popularly identified with Hitlerism. This assumption is just as false as the companion assumption that almost all American Jews are Zionists. Zionist propaganda has, however, frightened many Anti-Zionist Jews into silence.

The United States has become the partner of a British Empire which is fighting for its life--and Britain needs also the support of every people under her flag. Most emphatically she lacks the support of the Arabs, largely because of Zionism. The Arabs are disaffected; how disaffected is evidenced by the popular support accorded Rashid Ali in Iraq. The United States must some day give attention to this aspect of the general question whether our support of Britain against the Axis implies support of the British Empire throughout the world with its existing territories and policies. If the Axis should invade the Near East, Arab disloyalty will assume great practical importance.

Presently, the United States is not yet identified in any way with support of Zionism or of other unpopular British policies. We have a "good press" in the Arab world, in possession of the El-Bernameh of the West, as mechanical engineers, as educators, as the only remaining hope of peoples

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that appeal to principles of fairness and justice, as friends of oppressed nationalities. If Arab sympathies can be weaned away from the Axis, we can do it. If anything approximating a fair settlement of the Arab-Zionist problem can be made acceptable to the less-fanatical elements among Arabs and Zionists, our Government will have to do it. But the Arab is intelligent and cynical. He suspects that we are committed to support the British Empire, whatever its errors may be. Therefore, if we are to counteract Axis influence and lay the foundations of a lasting peace in the Near East we must be clear in our own minds as to our aims. Obviously our policy must not be anti-British but must represent an understanding with London. On the other hand, the United States would be ill-advised to become committed to unquestioning support of existing British policies toward Arabs and Zionists.

The conflicting interests which center around the problem make it difficult to outline a policy for the United States. Yet we must make the attempt, keeping in mind that there are some situations in which any decision is better than none. We at least have before us the sad spectacle of Britain's indecision. Certain considerations are fundamental to any constructive thinking on the problem: (1) Political Zionism, which demands a Palestine enlarged to include Trans-Jordan, solidly populated by Jews and ruled by Jews as an independent state, cannot solve the Jewish problem of the world. (2) Such a state, surrounded on every hand by Arabs,



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cannot singlehanded maintain its independence indefinitely. (3) Zionist Jews now in Palestine can never be expelled by governments professing humanitarian principles. (4) The ambitions of both Arab and Zionist extremists must be disregarded. (5) The British Empire need not be permitted by us to exploit confusion in Palestine for its own imperial purposes. (6) Any settlement envisaged by the United States must attempt to give satisfaction to reasonable persons, whether Arab, Jew, or Briton, and must be along lines acceptable to humanitarian world opinion. (7) In the Moslem Orient democracy is only a name for a system of government which is unfamiliar and misunderstood.

So far as the Arab world is concerned, its obvious trend of development is toward a loose federal union. Such a union would have to allow the fullest freedom to each component state to determine its own type of government, and we would have to expect that most of the governments would be oriental absolutisms, thinly veiled by Parliamentary forms. The Federation should constitute a customs union, with sufficient revenues from import tariffs to support the central government and enable it to maintain a few necessary services, such as a secretariat and diplomatic representation abroad. Once a federation is established, with states represented in regular meetings of a Federal Council, development toward a closer union may take place.



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In such a Federation, an autonomous Christian Lebanon and an autonomous Zionist area in Palestine might be represented within the delegation of a united Syrian-Palestinian state. Zionist immigration into Palestine would have to cease entirely for a period sufficiently long to convince reasonable Arabs that they would not be swamped by Jews. Jews and Christians living within the territories of the Federation must receive the most complete guarantees of minority rights.

Such a Federation could not prosper or perhaps even exist without the support of a great power, for ambitious rulers and divergent interests would provide centrifugal tendencies. Britain is the power best able to support and regulate the experiment, provided that American financial support is available and the potential American criticism is always in the offing. Britain would thus not lose her prestige in the Near East, for she would be responsible for wider territories than ever before. The experience of her trained public servants would be utilized in a work better suited to their abilities than that of maintaining the Old Empire. The responsibilities of the United States would not be so great as to constitute a serious problem of internal American politics. The Arabs of Palestine would lose their fear of becoming an exploited and landless minority. The political Zionists would have on a reduced scale the state which they now desire to set up and govern. Relations between Zionist

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colonists and Arabs would have a chance to cool off and moderate elements would have an opportunity for cooperation in developing along rational lines the potentialities of the country. The Semites of the West, versed in all the skills of the Occident, would be able to contribute to the development of the Semites of the East and of lands which need capital and industrial techniques with which Jews are familiar in Europe and America. and perhaps most important of all, the pitiable remnant of the Jews of the world would be saved from the fate which is being prepared for them by a small minority of misguided enthusiasts--the Political Zionists.

MURRAY HILL 2-1160

## Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs

41 EAST 42nd STREET  
ROOM 1121  
NEW YORK CITY

DEC 6 1941

December 5, 1941

Colonel William J. Donovan  
Director of Coordination and Information  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

In accordance with the very kind suggestion which you made when I met you the other day together with Mr. Neumann, I am sending you herewith a memorandum on the Jewish War Effort and War Offers, as well as a brief summary thereof.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank you for your kindness in giving us an opportunity to present to you the case for the Jewish Army.

Faithfully yours,

*D. Ben-Gurion*

David Ben-Gurion  
Chairman of the Executive  
of the Jewish Agency for Palestine

mg/sh

*acknowledged  
12/14/41  
[signature]*

The Jewish war effort and the negotiations of the Jewish Agency and the British Government for the formation of a Jewish Army fall under two headings:

- 1) Palestine: Mobilization of Palestinian Jews for the defense of the country and of the British positions in the Middle East.
- 2) Outside Palestine: Mobilization of Jews in neutral and friendly countries who are willing and free to do so, to fight in a Jewish unit on any front.

#### MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF PALESTINE

Palestine is a small country, but with the Middle East once again becoming a war theatre of the greatest importance, it is a factor of unique value for Britain in that part of the world for two reasons:

- a) Its central geographical position in relation to Egypt to the South, Syria and Turkey to the North, Iraq and Iran to the East, and the Mediterranean to the West.
- b) The fact that it provides Britain, in the Jewish National Home, with a trusted ally, and a considerable war-potential, both in men and material.

At the outbreak of the war Great Britain had three formal Allies in the Middle East; Egypt, Iraq and Turkey. All of these were bound to her by treaty and might have been expected to fight on her side. So far not a single soldier from any of them is fighting for the Allied cause. Egypt remains neutral, even under Axis attack, and constant danger of invasion; Iraq has taken up arms on the wrong side, and has had to be reconquered. The only country in the Middle East which has so far given any help at all to the British war effort is Jewish Palestine.

From this strip of land, 10,000 Jews were serving last year in different units of the land, sea and airforces of the British Empire in the Middle East. The Jewish economy of Palestine has set itself to provide the British army with supplies and services essential to the war effort. To this end it enjoys certain special advantages: a) a supply of modern technicians and skilled labor; b) a number of modern plants; c) scientific institutions of European standards; d) a considerable free capital brought in by immigrants and available for the expansion of agricultural and industrial enterprises. It has one other unique asset from the war point of view. Among the recent immigrants into Palestine there are many who have a thorough knowledge of the industrial life of the various enemy countries — Germany, Austria, Italy, Czechoslovakia, etc. Some even had such information about military inventions and military preparations there. This information was collated and sifted, and eventually found its way through the appropriate channels, to the Admiralty, the Air Ministry, the War Office, and the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

Ever since the outbreak of the war the Jewish Agency realized that it was of the utmost importance that the Palestine economy should be placed on a war footing and that the production of foodstuffs should be expanded to the maximum to meet the needs of the military, etc. It was obviously important that military supplies should if possible be provided on the spot in order to save both time and shipping space, and especially so in the case of urgently needed goods and accessories whose transport from England would have been too slow for military exigencies. The same applies to repairs, which by the nature of the work, had to be done on the spot.

Unfortunately the industrial effort of Jewish Palestine has had to be made without Government assistance, and (at the beginning of the war) even in spite of some obstruction from the Palestine Administration. Our economic

effort had further to contend from the outset with certain serious shortages in raw materials. The military authorities, happily, unlike the civil administration, were constantly helpful.

The stationing in Palestine of numerous Army Units, called for very extensive public works, including the building of camps, the erection of fortifications, the building of hospitals, construction of roads, etc. Many of these works had to be completed on very short notice, and it was fortunate that a large Jewish labor force, skilled in building and constructional work and organized in a special contracting organization - the "Solel Boneh" - was on the spot and proved equal to the most exacting tasks, which it carried through to the full satisfaction of the military authorities.

Immediately on the outbreak of the war, the Hebrew University communicated with the appropriate authorities and offered the services of its scientific staff in the interests of the war effort. The Hebrew Technical Institute in Haifa has been cooperating, since the outbreak of the war, with the Royal Engineers in the Northern District in the testing of construction materials, and has carried out all kinds of research work for the army. The electrical laboratories build and repair instruments and motors for the Army and Navy as well as for industries supplying the troops.

#### JEWS OFFER AN ARMY IN PALESTINE

At the outbreak of the war the Jewish Agency issued a call to the Jews in Palestine for general registration for National Service. Eighty thousand men and fifty thousand women between the ages of 18 and 50 responded to that call. The greater part of the men of military age expressed their readiness for military service. The Jewish Agency then submitted to the Government, in Jerusalem and in London, an offer to form Jewish units for service with the British Army. Under the Chamberlain Government these offers were rejected



out of hand. The Palestine Administration seemed scarcely to know there was a war on, its main attention at that time being devoted to obstructing the growth of the Jewish National Home.

With the fall of the appeasement government, and the approach of the war to the Middle East, some change was noticeable. Jewish recruits were not only accepted but were even asked for, in growing numbers, though at first only for service units, and not in combatant formations. As the requirements of the war grew more urgent, the prejudices of the Palestine Administration had to give way, and the services of the Jews were requested for the R. A. F., and later also for the infantry. In June of this year, Jewish units to a number of some 10,000 men, were serving with the British forces in Palestine and the Middle East -- in the R.A.F., Royal Engineers, Pioneers, Motor Transport Units, Naval Auxiliary Units, Royal Artillery (A.A. Defense), and the Buffs (Royal East Kent Regiment). They have taken part in the campaigns in Libya, Egypt, Abyssinia, Greece, Crete and Syria.

This is by no means the limit of the help which Jewish Palestine can give, either in the economic field or by way of manpower. There are at least another 30,000 or 40,000 young men who are eager to serve. The agricultural and industrial expansion of Palestine can be much further increased -- and with the spread of the war the supply question becomes more and more acute. Manpower may then perhaps be a principal concern. Many Australian and New Zealand soldiers now serving in Palestine wonder why they should have been torn from their homes and transported with great difficulty to the Middle East (and this at a time when Australia itself is not free from danger) when already on the spot in Palestine is a people eager to fight and who have already proved their value in the campaigns in which they have been allowed to take part. Even more do the Jews of Palestine wonder why their help was at first completely rejected, and later half-heartedly and grudgingly accepted -- never acknowledged, or recog-

nized, or reciprocated. The name "Jew" is never mentioned in any dispatch - even when thousands of Jews may have taken part in a battle or a campaign.

#### JEWISH WAR OFFER OUTSIDE PALESTINE

The help which Palestine can give is, of course, limited. But besides the actual Palestine, there is another "potential Palestine" which has much larger possibilities. If Jewish manpower in Palestine were to be used to the full - and this can be done only if they are enabled to fight as Jews in Jewish units - then not only the Jews of Palestine but also those of other neutral countries and especially of the America, would come in large numbers to join their Palestinian fellows and fight in the Middle East or wherever else they may be needed.

Having in mind therefore the services which might be rendered by those outside Palestine as well as those of Palestine itself, the Jewish Agency offered also a Jewish fighting unit for service with Britain and her allies on any front. This offer was first made in a concrete form at the beginning of December 1939, but it was rejected by the Chamberlain Government. It was then renewed when the Churchill Government came into power. That Government definitely accepted the proposal and a decision was taken to organize a Jewish fighting unit. Various matters of detail were discussed, and a General to command the unit was even appointed.

After the death of Lord Lloyd, in February 1941, the formation of the unit was postponed and the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Moyne, in a letter to Dr. Weizmann dated March 4, 1941, wrote: "I am very sorry that I have to tell you that the raising of a Jewish contingent is to be postponed owing to lack of equipment. The project must at present be put off for six months, but may be considered again in four months." Lord Moyne added, "I can assure you that this postponement is in no sense a reversal of the previous decision in

favor of your proposal."

Lord Moyne has last week told the House of Lords that owing to lack of equipment there is no prospect of accepting the proposal under present conditions. The statement that lack of equipment prevents the formation of a Jewish unit is unconvincing; the same state of equipment did not prevent, and fortunately so, the formation and equipment prevents the formation of a Jewish unit is unconvincing; the same state of equipment did not prevent, and fortunately so, the formation and equipment of British armies of millions of men throughout the world. The recent assurance given by Lord Moyne to the House of Lords that "encouragement is being given to recruitment of Palestine Jews" is even more amazing. Until now everything was done by the Palestine Administration to discourage the enlistment of Jews. Jewish units were denied a Jewish name and the use of their Jewish flag. Their services were recognized only under the anonymous term "Palestinians" and no direct mention was made of the part played by thousands of Palestinian Jews in the battles of the Middle East. For a long time the Jews were accepted only in service units, and when finally Jewish units were formed because war needs made it necessary to seek the use of Jewish man-power, the so-called "parity" principle was laid down - meaning that Jews could enlist only in such numbers as the Arabs would choose to do - it being known beforehand that Arabs were unwilling to serve. Later war necessities forced a relaxation of this principle of parity, and the enlistment of Jews was accepted even when Arabs refused to do so. But for these Jewish units, a peculiar organization without parallel in the British Army came into being. They are organized as unrelated Jewish companies, hanging in the air, not attached to any division or brigade or battalion - lest apparently a Jewish Battalion or a Jewish Brigade should emerge!

But in spite of this discouragement the Jews in Palestine will do

their best to fight Hitler and help England and the allies win the war, and they are confident that when the true facts are made known to the British and American peoples, this unfair and unwise treatment, unworthy as it is of the great moral cause for which Great Britain is fighting, will be changed, and the Jews will be given a fair opportunity to contribute to the maximum of their ability in Palestine and abroad, and fight as Jews in a Jewish Army possessing the same status as that of other allies of England.

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December 5, 1941

SUMMARY NOTE ON JEWISH WAR EFFORTA. PALESTINE

1. At the end of July 1941, some 10,000 Palestinian Jews were serving in various units of the British army: the R. A. F., Royal Engineers, Transport Pioneers, Infantry, Navy Auxiliaries and Anti-Aircraft Defense. They participated in all campaigns in the Middle East, Abyssinia, Egypt, Libya, Greece, Crete, Syria. There are at least another 30,000 to 40,000 young Palestinian Jews who are eager to fight as Jews, by the side of England.

2. While Jewish volunteers are placed in Jewish units, with the exception of those serving with the R. A. F., the Jewish units are denied their Jewish name, and the Jewish flag. Their existence is officially ignored. Never were their services mentioned in an official dispatch, their identity being hidden under the name of "Palestinians".

3. The different Jewish units are all disjointed. The Jewish infantry companies, for instance, are not attached to any division, brigade or battalion. They can, therefore, not have proper military training and their military usefulness is greatly impaired.

4. Jewish volunteers serving in the R. A. F. -- their number is 1300 -- are confined to ground-work, although many of them have the necessary technical qualifications.

5. A possible Nazi invasion of Palestine is a much graver menace to the Jewish community there than to the population of any other invaded country, for obvious reasons, and Palestinian Jewry are entitled to defend their country to the maximum of their ability and to participate in the defense of the British positions in the Middle East, of course under British command, but under their own name, the Jewish flag, as an ally of England, enjoying the same status as other allies -- the Poles, Czechs, Free French, etc.

B. OUTSIDE PALESTINE

1. In September 1940 the British Cabinet agreed to the formation of a Jewish military unit consisting of Jews from neutral countries, with a nucleus from Palestine, to be trained in England and serve on any front. A General to command the unit was appointed at that time.

2. After the death of Lord Lloyd, in February 1941, the formation of the unit was postponed and the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Moyne, in a letter to Dr. Weizmann dated March 4, 1941, wrote: "I am very sorry that I have to tell you that the raising of a Jewish contingent is to be postponed owing to lack of equipment. The project must at present be put off for six months, but may be considered again in four months."

Last week Lord Moyne informed the House of Lords that owing to lack of equipment the proposal for a Jewish unit was under present conditions dropped.

It is difficult to understand that the formation of a single Jewish division was prevented by lack of equipment during last year, when the same state of equipment did not prevent - very fortunately - the formation and equipment of British armies of millions of men throughout the world.